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Reform, Revolution, or Retrenchment?
International Human Rights in the Post-
Cold War Era
Brenda Cossman*
As Europe East and West struggles to come in from the cold, inter-
national human rights must confront the implications of profound
social, economic, and political change. It is a moment of both oppor-
tunity and challenge. The end of the Cold War may signal a renewed
possibility for the cooperation so essential for the realization of the
normative vision of international human rights. Notwithstanding such
hopes, I would argue that fundamental changes in the relationship
between East and West may undermine important dimensions of the
discourse of international human rights. Moreover, the focus of atten-
tion on the changes in the East may have devastating effects on the
relationship between North and South, and on the conception of
human rights law emerging from developing countries. As the Wall
is dismantled in Europe, new walls may only be going up elsewhere.
I. RIGHTS DISCOURSE AND DEMOCRATIC POSSIBILITIES
The end of the Cold War may bring renewed international com-
mitment to human rights. From its beginnings, international human
rights law has been limited by problems of enforcement. As one
commentator has written, "[ijnternational remedial paths remain frag-
ile, often illusory."' It has relied primarily on international coopera-
tion, moral suasion and condemnation to ensure compliance. More-
- Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. The author would like to thank James
Hathaway for his comments on an earlier draft, Donna Young for her research assistance, and
Christine Wright for her technical assistance.
1. Henry J. Steiner, Political Participation as a Human Right, I HARV. HuM. RTS. Y.B. 77,
81 (1988). See generally Torkel Opsahl, Instruments of Implementation of Human Rights, 10 HUM.
RTs. L.J. 13 (1989); GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE (Hurst Hannum
ed. 1984); Louis Sohn, Human Rights: Their Implementation and Supervision by the United Nations,
2 HuMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POucY Issuas 369 (Theodor Meron
ed. 1984); Robertson, The Implementation System: International Measures in THE INTERNATIONAL
BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITIcAL RIGHTS 332 (Louis Henkin ed.
1981); J.S. Watson, Legal Theory, Efficacy and Validity in the Development of Human Rights Norms
in International Law, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 609; Richard B. Bilder, Rethinking International Human
Rights: Some Basic Questions, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 171.
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over, this cooperation was often elusive in the Cold War world, where
deep political and ideological divides constrained the sanctioning of
human rights abuses by the international community. In a polarized
world, the discourse on human rights was often no more than a
rhetorical device in a political game of legitimation and delegitimation
which coexisted with superpowers turning a blind eye to the human
rights abuses in their own sphere of influence.
Yet, despite the weakness of the enforcement machinery and the
history of non-cooperation, there remains a strong commitment to the
discourse of human rights principles. As Philip Alston wrote in 1988,
It is now widely accepted that the characterization of a specific
goal as a human right elevates it above the rank and file of
competing social goals, gives it a degree of immunity from chal-
lenge and generally endows it with an aura of timelessness, ab-
soluteness and universal validity. 2
Human rights is a powerful political discourse-indeed, it is often
the only discourse in which disadvantaged groups may claim a voice
and legitimately make universal claims. 3 International, national and
grassroots organizations continue to make human rights the discourse
of choice in their struggles. Despite its institutional limitations, the
discourse provides an important source of political inspiration and
energy through which people can be educated and mobilized. 4
In a world no longer divided along the East/West axis, this political
discourse may have heightened possibilities. A world no longer divided
may better lend itself to the international cooperation so essential to
the realization of the vision of international human rights. On the
international level, we are witnessing the emergence of a renewed
commitment to the United Nations as a forum for the resolution of
2. Philip Alston, Making Space/or New Human Rights: Tht Case of the Right to Development, 1
HAv. HuM. RTs. Y.B. 3 (1988).
3. See Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideal from Deconstructed Rights, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401 (1987); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialtics of Rights and
Politics. Perspectivesfrom the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 589 (1986).
4. See Clarence J. Dias & James C.N. Paul, Developing Legal Resources for Participatory Orga-
nizations of The Rural Poor, 1985 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 19 (1985); James C.N. Paul &
Clarence J. Dias, Generating and Sharing Knowledge of Law for People-Centered Development, 1987
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STuD. 17; Clarence J. Dias & James C.N. Paul, Developing the Human
Right to Food as a Legal Resource for the Rural Poor: Some Strategies for NGOs, in THE RIGHT TO
FOOD 203 (P. Alston & K. Tomasevski eds. 1984); Edel Guiza, A Philippine Experience on Legal
Resources Development by the Rural Poor, 1987 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 93; Anisur Rahman,
The Roles and Significance of Participatory Organizations of the Rural Poor in Alternative Strategies of
Development, 1987 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 1.
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international conflict.5 Such international cooperation could assume
many forms in the area of human rights. The mechanisms for enforcing
and monitoring compliance with international human rights norms
could be improved within both Charter-6 and Convention-based pro-
cedures.7 States which have not already done so could ratify article 41
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
which provides for interstate complaints to the Human Rights Com-
mittee,8 as well as the Optional Protocol of the Covenant, which
allows the Committee to hear complaints from individuals. 9 Much
room exists for strengthening the procedures and remedies in the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (CERD), and the Convention for the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).1 0 For ex-
5. For a discussion of the role of the U.N. in the areas of peace, environment, and economic
development in the aftermath of the Cold War, see Lister, The Role of International Organizations
in the 1990s and Beyond, 1990 INT'L RELATIONS 101.
6. The Charter of the United Nations sets out the general human rights mandate of the
U.N. and empowers several subsidiary bodies to implement this mandate. Most notably, the
General Assembly is directed to initiate studies and make recommendations to promote human
rights, and the Economic and Social Council [ECOSOCI is directed to make recommendations
in the promotion of human rights. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 13, 55, 56, 62, 64, 68. See
generally Tom J. Farer, The United Nations and Human Rights: More Than a Whimper Less Than a
Roar, 9 Hum. RTS. Q. 550 (1987); UNITED NATIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS (1984). In addition to the mandate for fact finding and making recommendations,
ECOSOC in 1970 adopted the Procedure for Dealing with Communications Relating to Vio-
lations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, June 19, 1970, E.S.C. Res. 1503
(XLVIII), 48 UN ECOSOC, UN Doc. E/RES/1503 (XLVIII) (1970) (hereinafter Procedure
1503). Procedure 1503 empowers the Human Rights Commission and its Subcommission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to receive complaints which "reveal
a consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of human rights and fundamental
freedoms." Id. at 1. See generally M.E. Tardu, The United Nations Response to Gross Violations of
Human Rights: The 1503 Procedure, 20 SANTA CLARA L.R. 559 (1980).
7. The International Bill of Rights, comprised of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and two Covenants, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, imposes a system of periodic reporting on
member states. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), 3 UN GAOR
71, UN Doc. A/810 (1948) (Universal Declaration), International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A, 21 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, UN Doc. A/16316 (1966),
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc A/16316 (1966) (ICESCR).
8. The Declaration regarding article 41 of the ICCPR entered into force March 28, 1979,
with 10 ratifications. As of January 1, 1989, the interstate complaints procedure had been
ratified by 23 countries. Neither the United States nor the countries of Eastern Europe, with
the exception of Hungary, had ratified the Declaration.
9. The Optional Protocol of the ICCPR entered into force March 23, 1976. As of January
1, 1989, 43 countries had ratified it. Neither the U.S. nor the countries of Eastern Europe,
again with the recent exception of Hungary, had ratified it.
10. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
G.A. Resolution 2106A (XX), 20 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 4) 47, UN Doc A/6014 (1965),
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/
180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) 193, UN Doc. A/Res 134/180 (1980), entered into force
September 3, 1981. For a discussion of the weak enforcement machinery under CEDAW, see
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ample, many more states could ratify the Declaration regarding article
14 of CERD, allowing the Committee on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination to receive communications from in-
dividuals.' 1 A provision similar to article 14 could be added to
CEDAW. 12
Even short of precipitating formal changes in the enforcement ma-
chinery of international instruments, the end of the Cold War may
open other and perhaps more significant opportunities for human
rights. Improved international cooperation may facilitate the work of
the various agencies, committees, and working groups engaged in
monitoring compliance with human rights obligations. Until now,
the operations of these groups and institutions have been severely
limited by the deep and often hostile political and ideological differ-
ences of their members.
There is some indication that such cooperation is already emerging
within the United Nations human rights forums. For example, the
forty-first Session of the U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in August 1989 was
reportedly marked by "a new spirit of cooperation between Sub-
Commission members from the United States and the Soviet Union," 13
the 1989 Session of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights was
reportedly "marked by a slight decrease in ideological polarization as
Burrows, International Law and Human Rights: The Case of Womens Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS:
FROM RHrroRic TO REALITY 80, (T. Campbell, D. Goldberg, S. McLean & T. Mullen eds.
1986); Margaret E. Galey, International Enforcemnt of Women's Rights, 6 Hum. RTs. Q. 463
(1984). For a comprehensive bibliography regarding CEDAW, see RebeccaJ. Cook, Bibliography:
The International Right to Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 161 (1989).
11. The Declaration regarding article 14 of CERD entered into force December 3, 1982. As
of January 1, 1989, only 12 countries had ratified the Declaration. Neither the U.S. nor the
countries of Eastern Europe have ratified this Declaration.
12. See THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW-MAKING IN THE UNITED NATIONS 81-82
(1986); Laura Reanda, Human Rights and Women's Rights: The United Nations Approach, 3(2) HUM.
RTS. Q. 11, 22-23 (1981).
13. Robin M. Maher & David Weissbrodt, The 41st Session of the UN Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 12 HuM. RTs. Q. 290, 297 (1990). Maher
and Weissbrodt note that U.S. and USSR representatives co-sponsored three resolutions on the
right to fair trial, the prevention of raking hostages, and the elimination of racial discrimination,
and they co-authored a working paper on revised procedures for dealing with human rights
violations under Procedure 1503. Id. at 297-98. This increased cooperation can be seen as
evidence of a transition in the Soviet approach to the enforcement of international human rights.
The Soviets have long resisted an international role in the enforcement of human rights, based
on the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs. See Richard N. Dean, Beyond Helsinki.
The Soviet View of Human Rights in International Law, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 55, 77-83 (1980);
Jhabvala, The Soviet Blocs View of the Implementation of Human Rights Accord, 7 Hum. RTs. Q.
461 (1985). More recently, however, the Soviets appear to have recognized a role for international
enforcement. For example, in September 1988, Soviet Foreign Minister Schevardnadze, speaking
to the U.N. General Assembly, called international control in areas from arms control to human
rights "an imperative of our time." See Opsahl, supra note 1, at 20.
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compared with previous sessions,"'' 4 and the 1990 Session of the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights reportedly "witnessed a radical shift
in the positions of Eastern European Countries."' 5
The changing international climate may also enlarge the role re-
gional organizations play in human rights enforcement. Non-binding
regional standards such as those contained in the Helsinki Final Act
of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 16 may acquire
new importance in the wake of the CSCE's emergence as a key vehicle
for shaping the post-Cold War Europe. Despite their focus on security
issues, recent meetings of the CSCE have directed considerable atten-
tion to human rights. Indeed, the Concluding Document of the
Follow-Up of the CSCE in January 1989 has been described as sig-
nifying "great progress as regards human rights."'17 Under the new
conditions of cooperation, non-binding human rights standards such
as those promulgated by the CSCE might be as effective as, if not
more so than, binding instruments lacking cooperative context.
II. HUMAN RIGHTS IN TRANSITION
The transcendence of oppositions in the post-Cold War era may
open possibilities for international human rights in democratic strug-
gles. Yet, the failure to transcend the oppositions of political philos-
ophy may limit these possibilities. The collapse of the Communist
bloc has been accompanied by a radical shift to the right in the political
orientation of the countries of Eastern Europe, and the post-Cold War
political climate may be less one of transcendence than it is of
retrenchment.
14. Brody & Weissbrodt, Major Developments at the 1989 Session of the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights, 11 HUM. RTs. Q. 586, 611 (1989).
15. Reed Brody, Penny Parker & David Weissbrodr, Major Developments in 1990 at the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights, 12 HuM. RTs. Q. 559, 560 (1990). At the 1990 Session, Bulgaria
and Hungary voted for scrutiny of China, Cuba, and Iraq (although the USSR voted against the
first two resolutions and did not participate in the vote on the third, it proposed measures to
increase and strengthen the role of the Human Rights Commission. Id. at 560). See also Brody
& Weissbrodr, supra note 14, at 611.
16. The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe of 1975 (CSCE)
was signed in Helsinki on August 1, 1975 by 35 countries, including the countries of Eastern
and Western Europe, as well as the U.S. and Canada.
17. Hannes Tretrer, Human Rights in the Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow-Up Meeting
of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe of January 15, 1989: An Introduction, 10
HUM. RTs. L.J. 257, 259 (1989). For the text of the Concluding Document, see 10 HuM.
R'rs. L.J. 270 (1989). These proceedings can be seen as further evidence of the transition in
the Soviet approach to the enforcement of. human rights. Tretter reports that the socialist
countries' understanding of human rights and the concomitant focus on the basic principle of
non-interference in internal affairs have "receded into the background (with the exception of
Romania) and halve] apparently been replaced by the recognition of international responsibility
for human rights." Tretter, supra, at 259. See also id. at 261-62.
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Most current international human rights norms emerged in the
aftermath of World War II, a product of the competing political
ideologies of that period. The three generations of human rights
correspond to three different political visions: civil and political rights
associated with Western liberal democracies; social and economic
rights associated with Eastern socialist states; and development rights
associated with post-colonial, developing countries. ' 8 The very division
of the International Bill of Rights into two Covenants-one dealing
with civil and political rights, the other dealing with social, economic,
and cultural rights-was in large part due to the political and ideo-
logical divisions of the post-war world. 19 It took almost two decades
from the adoption of the Universal Declaration to the adoption of the
Covenants to accommodate fundamental differences between liberal
and socialist conceptions of individual rights, and of the individual's
18. Stephen Marks argues that the discourse of contemporary international human rights can
be seen as the product of three different revolutionary movements: "first, the 'bourgeois' revo-
lutions, particularly in France and America, in the last quarter of the eighteenth century; second,
the socialist, anti-exploitation revolutions of the first two decades of this century; and third, the
anticolonialist revolutions that began immediately after the Second World War and culminated
in the independence of many nations around 1960." Stephen P. Marks, Emerging Human Rights:
A New Generation for the 1980s?, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 435, 440 (1981). See generally JeromeJ.
Shestack, The Jurisprudence of Human Rights, in 1 HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 69
(Theodor Meron ed. 1984). Address by Kasel Vasak, Inaugural Lecture to the Tenth Study
Session of the International Institute of Human Rights, in Strasbourg (July 2-27, 1979). Alston
noted that "[p]erhaps the most important . . . characteristic of international human rights law
is its philosophical complexity . . . [which] is the product of an ambivalent relationship to an
already discordant heritage of philosophical theories of rights." Alston, supra note 2, at 28.
19. The official justification for the division of the Convention into two legal instruments
was the allegedly fundamental difference between the two categories of rights and the different
mechanisms required for their implementation. V. Voitto Saario & Rosemary Higgins Cass, The
United Nations and the International Protection of Human Rights: A Legal Analysis and Interpretation,
7 CAL. W. INTL L.J. 591, 595-97 (1977). Humphrey has noted that it is technically possible
to include both categories of rights in the same instrument with different implementation
systems, and that the decision to have two covenants was motivated primarily by the political
and ideological divisions within the U.N. Humphrey, The International Law of Human Rights in
the Middle of the Twentieth Century, in THE PRESENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (M. Box
ed. 1973). Some states-most notably the U.S.-have never accepted the validity of a covenant
on social and economic rights. They argued that social and economic claims were appropriately
construed as interests or aspirations, not as rights. The division of the Convention into two legal
instruments allowed states to ratify one Covenant without the other. See OSCAR SCHACHTER,
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: GENERAL COURSE IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAw (1985); David M. Trubek, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in the Third World: Human
Rights Law and Human Needs Programs, in 1 HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL
AND POLICY IssUEs 205 (Theodor Meron ed. 1984); David P. Forsythe, Socioeconomic Human
Rights: The United Nations, the United States, and Beyond, 4 Hum. RTs. Q. 433 (1982). For the
argument that social and economic rights are not rights, see MAURICE WILLIAM CRANSTON,
WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? (1973). See also E.W. Vierdag, The Legal Nature of the Rights
Granted by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 NETH. Y.B. INT'L
L. 69 (1978).
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relation to society.20 While the international community has recog-
nized the indivisibility of all human rights on several occasions
2
contemporary international human rights discourse remains the prod-
uct of a precarious balance of ideological differences.
As the East embraces laissez-faire economics, what will become of
the social and economic rights the East has historically advocated? A
trend away from social and economic rights towards civil and political
rights is becoming increasingly visible throughout Eastern Europe. 22
Although it is important to recognize the progress that has been made
within the United Nations system in advancing social and economic
rights,2 3 we must consider the real possibility of a backslide on recent
commitments. The countries of East and West may now agree on the
priority of civil and political rights over social and economic rights.
Indeed, they may even agree that the latter are not appropriately
understood as rights, but only as aspirations. Paradoxically, the pos-
sibility for heightened cooperation in the promotion of human rights
may be a product of the narrowing of the discourse itself.
Even within the realm of civil and political rights, we must further
ask whether some rights will be more equal than others. Will all civil
and political rights be given equal significance, or will the shifting
ideological balance privilege individualistic, libertarian rights of free-
dom from state intervention over collective, egalitarian rights, such
as the freedom from discrimination? Two examples, although far from
conclusive, are illustrative of the political mood of Eastern Europe,
and suggest reason to be concerned about the future of human rights.
20. For a discussion of the fundamental differences in conceptions of the human rights, see
Bloed & van Hoof, Some Aspects of the Socialist View of Human Rights, in ESSAYS ON HuMAN
RIGHTS IN THE HELSINKI PROCESS (A. Bloed & P. van Dijk eds. 1985); Farrokh Jhabvala,
supra note 13; Lane, Human Rights Under State Socialism, 32 POL. STUD. 349 (1984); Sinha,
Human Rights: A Non-Western Viewpoint, 67 ARCHLY FOR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 76
(1981); Dean, supra note 13, at 55; Przeracznik, The Socialist Concept of Human Rights, 13 REVUE
BELGE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 238 (1977).
21. Proclamation of Teheran, adopted by the International Conference on Human Rights in
1968, and confirmed by the General Assembly on January 13, 1969, UN Doc. A/Res/2416
(XXIII) to A/Res/2450 (XXIII), recognizing that the full realization of civil and political rights
is impossible without the enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights. See also the General
Assembly Resolution in 1977, "Alternative Approaches and Ways and Means Within the United
Nations System for Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms," Feb. 24, 1978, AlRes/32/130, para. l(a) at 2 (recognizing that human rights are
indivisible and interdependent).
22. In recent meetings of the CSCE, the countries of Eastern Europe have not insisted on
the inclusion of social and economic rights in exchange for the recognition of civil and political
rights. See Tretter, supra note 17, at 259. The Concluding Document of the Vienna meeting
did not refer to the indivisibility of human rights at all. Id. at 262.
23. For a discussion of the recent developments on social and economic rights, see Philip
Alston, Out of the Abyss: The Challenges Confronting the New U.N. Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 332 (1987); Philip Alston & Bruno Simma, First Session
of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 747 (1987).
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The first example is the attack on ethnic minorities throughout
Eastern Europe. Nationalist movements unleashed by political liber-
alization have engaged in widespread ethnic violence. In Romania,
extremist groups are fueling hatred against ethnic Hungarians, Ger-
mans, Gypsies, and Jews. In the Soviet Union, violence erupted
between Armenians and Azeris, Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks, Geor-
gians and Abkhazians. In Bulgaria, nationalism has been directed
against the Turkish minority. In Yugoslavia, tensions between the six
national republics, as well as the eighteen other nationalities, are
threatening to tear the country apart. 24 Throughout Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union, anti-Semitism is experiencing a tragic revival. 25
The second example is the assault on women's rights. Women are
experiencing a disproportionate impact of the inflation and unemploy-
ment that accompany the transition to free-market economies in East-
ern Europe. Most East European women are in the workforce3 6 How-
ever, they are at high risk of losing their job security and their
maternity benefits, as well as other benefits.2 7 With rising unemploy-
24. Quarrels Divide Ethnic Groups, The Globe and Mail, Dec. 11, 1990, at B20, col. 6;
Borrell, The Bills Come Due: After a Year ofFreedom, Eastern Europe Realizes That Toppling Statues
of Stalin and Lenin is Easier Than Erecting Stable Democracies and Free Markets, TIME, Dec. 3,
1990; Neier, Watching Rights, THE NATION, Sept. 17, 1990, at 263, col. 1; The Dark Side of
Nationalism, editorial, The Globe and Mail, Mar. 31, 1990, at D6, col. 1; Deak, Uncovering
Eastern Europe's Dark History, 10 SAIS REV. 51 (1990); Jonathan Eyal, Eastern Europe: WJ'at
About the Minorities?, 45(12) WORLD TODAY 205-08 (Dec. 1989); Robert D. Kaplan, Europe's
Third World: Poverty and Ethnic Strife in Southeastern Europe Will Give Russia a Headache for Years
to Come, ATLANTic MONTHLY, Jul. 1989, at 16, col. 6.
25. Anti-Semitic incidents have been reported throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union. In East Germany, members of the miniscule Jewish communities in the southern cities
of Leipzig, Dresden, and Erfurt speak of vicious anonymous phone calls. In the Soviet Union,
Jewish cemeteries and synagogues in Moscow and Leningrad have been desecrated, and rumors
of pogroms are being spread by members of extremist groups, such as Pamiat', which blames
Jews for the Communist regime. In Hungary, references to the predominance of Jews in the
regime of dictator Matyas Rakosi in the 1950s are heard. In Romania, where the desecration of
synagogues and cemeteries has been the most widespread, Jews are frequently accused of
collaborating with the regime of Nicolae Ceausescu. For discussion of these developments, see
Bierman, New Openness, Old Hatred: Anti-Semitism Stalks Eastern Europe, MACLEAN'S, Apr. 16,
1990, at 26, col. 1; Wilson-Smith, The Jews: Anti-Semitism is on the Rise in the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe, MACLEAN'S, Apr. 16, 1990, at 22, col. 4; Talbott, Freedom's Ugly Underside:
Anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe, TimE, Nov. 27, 1989, at 53.
26. In 1980, women constituted one-half of the labor force in Eastern Europe. Molyneux,
Women and Perestroika, 1983 NEw LEFr REv. 23, 27 (1990).
27. In Hungary, for example, over 80% of women work in the labor force. A woman is
entitled to receive 24-week maternity leave with full pay, followed by a three-year leave at
partial salary, and her position guaranteed upon return. Zsuzsa Ferge, a sociologist at Eotvos
Lorand University in Budapest stated in a recent interview: "No market economy is going to
guarantee a job after a three-year absence." Democratic Revolution Brings Few Advantages to Many,
Globe and Mail, Nov. 26, 1990, at A13. In Poland, where women constituted 46% of the
labor force, this right has already been rescinded. The transition to a market economy is expected
to produce high unemployment, and women are expected to be disproportionately affected.
According to some estimates, 80% of those already laid off are women. Brenan S. Bishop, From
Women's Rights to Feminist Politics: The Developing Struggle for Womm's Liberation in Poland, 42
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ment, women are the first to be laid off and thereby forced to return
to the sphere of domestic labor. Moreover, social pressure is mounting
on women to return to the home voluntarily. Further, divorce and
abortion rights are under attack in many Eastern European countries.
In Poland, where the anti-abortion movement has been the strongest,
a woman now must visit three doctors and a psychologist before she
can have an abortion at a publicly funded hospital. 2 Last November,
a bill which proposed banning abortion passed the Polish Senate. 29
Such discrimination, harassment, and violence directed against
women and minorities constitute a clear violation of international
human rights standards. 30 The attack on the rights of ethnic minorities
has been identified as a serious problem at both the international and
regional level. For example, in 1988, the U.N. Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, after many
years of sidestepping this divisive issue, decided to consider the pro-
tection of racial, ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities.3 1 Simi-
larly, increased attention has been directed toward the rights of mi-
norities within the CSCE, which has been called upon to meet the
MONTHLY REV. 13, 21 (1990). In Belgrade human rights activist Sonja Licht observes: "Already
there is a tendency to think that the women must be sent home . . . . If you have to choose
who is going to lose a job, then of course, you would choose women first, because, after all,
they are mothers anyway." Democratic Revolution Brings Few Advantages, supra. See also Challenge
in the East: The Emerging Democrade Offer a Chance for Women to Share Real, Rather Than Cosmetic,
Power, TME 130 (Special Issue, Fall, 1990). While reports of the impact of Perestroika on
women's employment in the Soviet Union is conflicting, many Soviet commentators have argued
that economic restructuring will require that women give up their jobs, and return to the sphere
of the family. See Molyneux, supra note 26. As Molyneux notes, "A convenient link between
increasing the population and raising productivity is thereby established. Predictably, the group
of Russian patriots associated with Pamyat welcomes 'modernization' as a 'way to raise production
standards and free women from involuntary emancipation and return her to the family where
she fills the role of mother, keeper of the hearth and bulwark of the nation."' Id. at 38-39.
28. Waclav Dec, head of obstetrics and gynecology at the Medical Academy in Lodz, has
stated of these amendments: "These rules serve no medical purpose. It is another attempt to
humiliate women. These psychologists are generally Church people who try to persuade women
not to have abortions." Stephen Engelberg, Anti-Abortion Bill Prompts Poles to Debate the Church's
Influence, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
29. The lower house postponed the vote on the bill until after the presidential election. Id.
A similar battle is developing in the Croatian republic of Yugoslavia where the Catholic Church
is also a strong political influence. In Serbia, married couples with no children are being
threatened with punitive taxes. See also Democratic Revolution Brings Few Advantages to Many, supra
note 27.
30. The Universal Declaration, ICCPR, and the ICESR specifically recognize the right to
non-discrimination on the basis of national origin, religion, and language; CERD specifically
prohibits discrimination on the basis of national or ethnic origin. ICERD art. 4 further requires
that states adopt measures to eradicate hatred and incitement, and to prohibit racist organizations.
See also ICCPR art. 27. The U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration, the ICCPR, and the
ICESCR each recognize the right to freedom on the basis of sex. Universal Declaration, art. 2;
ICCPR art. 26, ICESCR, arts 2(2), 3. The CEDAW specifically prohibits such discrimination
in the employment and family context. CEDAW, supra note 10.
31. Maher & Weissbrodt, supra note 13, at 312.
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challenges of the anti-Semitism and ethnic hatred that is sweeping
across Eastern Europe. At its recent meetings, the CSCE has directed
increased attention to develop protections for the rights of ethnic
minorities. 32 While some observers still argue that international in-
struments are inadequate for the protection of ethnic minorities, 33
some official efforts are being made to offset the rising intolerance
toward ethnic minorities. There is at least some evidence that the
states of Eastern Europe are resisting the assault on the rights of ethnic
minorities by adopting official measures to protect them. The same,
however, cannot be said of women's rights. On the contrary, official
state discourse often encourages discrimination against women.34 It
may be that women's rights, tied as they are to social and economic
rights, will be first among the victims of retrenchment in human
rights discourse.
III. RIGHTS DISCOURSE AND DEVELOPMENT
The heightened possibilities for cooperation in the promotion and
substantive realization of international human rights presumes a world
less divided. Yet, it is not at all clear that the end of the Cold War
does signify the emergence of a world order that is in fact less divided.
It may only signify a realignment of these divisions. As the divide
between East and West disappears, the divide between North and
South may only deepen.
Rights discourse has assumed a prominent role in the political,
economic and ideological struggles of the developing world to create
32. At a recent Helsinki-sponsored Conference on the Human Dimension, held in Copenhagen
in June 1990, the 35 members of the CSCE adopted a resolution that included the need to
guarantee political pluralism, the protection of minorities, and the importance of confronting
anti-Semitism and racism. See Korey, The CSCE and Human Rights: A New Chapter for Heijinki,
73 THE NEW LEADER 11, 13 (1990); Protection of Minorities Crucial, Human Rights Organization
Says, Globe and Mail, June 8, 1990, at A14. This concern was echoed at the Paris meeting in
November 1990.
33. Eyal, supra note 24; see also T.H. BAGLEY, GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF MINORITIES (1950); UNITED NATIONS, DEFINITION AND
CLASSIFICATION OF MINORITIES, UN Public. Sales No. 1950. XIV.3; F. CAPORTORTI, STUDY
ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS BELONGING TO ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTIC MINORITIES,
UN Public. Sales No. E.78.XIV. 1, at 5-16 (1979). While considerable efforts were made by
the Sub-Committee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, and in turn,
by the U.N. General Assembly, to deal with the issue of the protection of ethnic minorities,
the proceedings did not progress beyond a mere definition of ethnic minorities, as well as the
principle that such minorities ought to receive special rights. After the adoption of article 27
of the ICCPR, similar problems were encountered in interpreting the concepts of "minorities,"
"ethnic minorities," and "culture." See generally id.
34. As Molyneux has noted, the call for women to return to the home in the Soviet Union
"is not exclusively a neo-conservative and nationalist position: Gorbachev, too, has referred to
the 'purely womanly mission,' investing domesticity and motherhood with an aura of the sacred
and natural." Molyneux, supra note 26, at 38.
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a New International Economic Order. The relationship between rights
and development has been recognized by the U.N. General Assembly
in its recognition of the right to development as an inalienable human
right. 3" However, this relationship between rights discourse and de-
velopment has been controversial, with little support for this third
generation human right forthcoming from the West. The United
States is the only country to have voted against the Declaration on the
Right to Development, and many other Western countries abstained
from the vote. 36 The Working Group on the Right to Development
was plagued by these political and ideological divisions. 37 For example,
on the issue of the subjects of the right to development both socialist
and developing countries were of the opinion that development should
be a right of individuals, peoples and States. Developed countries, on
the other hand, tended to take the position that development is only
a right of individuals. 38 The debate reflected a deeper tension in the
very conception of rights between individual and collective rights, a
tension that also underlies the debate regarding social and economic
rights. 39 In the end, the working group achieved what Alston de-
scribed as "a relatively artificial consensus" that locked the parties into
a "set of very carefully negotiated compromise positions from which
35. Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, Annex, 41 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 53) at 186, U.N. Doc. A141/53 (1986). For a general discussion of the right to
development, see Alston, supra note 2; Kiwanuka, Developing Rights: The UN Declaration on the
Right to Development, 35 INT'L L. REV. 257 (1988); Turk, The Human Rights to Development, in
RESTRUCTURING THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: THE ROLE OF LAW AND LAWYERS
(P. Van Dijk ed. 1987); Philip Alston, Third Generation of Solidarity Rights: Progressive Development
or Obfuscation of International Human Rights Law, 29 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 307 (1982); K. de
Vey Mestdagh, The Right to Development: From Evolving Principle to "Legal" Right, in DEVELOP-
MENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW 143 (1981); Marks, supra note 18.
36. Denmark, Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom all abstained from the vote on the Declaration. Declaration on the
Right to Development, supra note 35.
37. The Working Group of Government Experts on the Right to Development was established
pursuant to the Commission on Human Rights, Res. 36, para. 10, in COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE THIRTY-SEVENTH SESSION 37, U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 5) at 237,
U.N. Doc. E/1981/25 (1981).
38. Kiwanuka, sspra note 35, at 260-67. However, as Kiwanuka notes, some developed
countries, notably Canada and Australia, adopted a compromise position. Despite their reluctance
to recognize the collective dimension of rights, they voted in favor of the Declaration.
39. For a review of these arguments in relation to the right to development, see generally
Alston, supra note 2. For arguments that human rights in general and the right to development
in particular, are individual not collective rights, see Jack Donnelly, In Search of the Unicorn: The
Jurisprudence and Politics of the Rights to Development, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 473 (1985); Jack
Donnelly, Human Rights as Natural Rights, 4 HUm. RTS. Q. 391 (1982). For arguments that
the right to development is both an individual and collective right, see Bejaoui, Some Unorthodox
Reflections on the Right to Development, in INTERNATIONAL LAW OF DEVELOPMENT: COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES 87 (Francis Snyder & Peter Slinn eds. 1987).
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there can be no creative escape." 40 As a result, the working group has
made very little progress since the adoption of the declaration.
41
Furthermore, the right to development is seen to embrace both the
first and second generation of rights, that is, it is based on the
realization of both civil and political rights, and social and economic
rights. While the right builds on the emerging international recog-
nition of the indivisibility of these two categories of rights, it is at
the same time plagued by the controversy regarding social and eco-
nomic rights.
A fundamental question that must be considered is to what extent
the transformation in Eastern Europe, and the concomitant realign-
ment of political, economic and ideological interests between East and
West, will affect this precarious consensus on the right to develop-
ment. Will the developing world lose the support it had garnered
from the Communist bloc in support of the solidarity rights in general
and the right to development in particular? As the East becomes West,
in economic and political orientation, what will become of these
emerging rights? An evaporating commitment to collective rights, to
social and economic rights, to the indivisibility of rights, and to the
positive duties implied by these rights may only further undermine
the tenuous international support for the third generation of solidarity
rights. Moreover, to the countries of the South, the right to devel-
opment represents a synthesis of all human rights, a holistic vision of
the relationship between rights and development which informs their
approach to all human rights. The loss of support for the right to
development may thereby signify a growing divide in the human
rights visions of North and South more generally. Indeed, the 1990
Session of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights is reported to
have been "marked by a growing North-South division, both on
substantive issues and on the future of the Commission itself."42
The implications of the basis of support for the right to development
are not only symbolic. The realization of the right to development has
been seen to require a fundamental restructuring of the international
instruments of the international economic order, such as GATT, IMF,
the World Bank, as well as bilateral treaties for the promotion and
protection of foreign investment, and bilateral development assis-
tance. 43 However, the realignment of political, economic and ideolog-
ical interests in the developed world may well represent an insur-
40. Alston, supra note 2, at 23.
41. Id.
42. Brody, Parker & Weissbrodt, supra note 15, at 587.
43. See Turk, supra note 35; Khan, International Law a/Development at Edinburgh: Methodology,
Content and Salient Ltuejr, 1986 THIRD WORLD IGAL STUD. 15; Paul International Deweopmnt
Agender, Human Rights and Humane Development Projets, 14 ALTERNATIVES 77 (1989).
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mountable obstacle to these initiatives. The transition in political
orientation in Eastern Europe in many respects reflects the deeper
economic transition from socialist planned economics to capitalist
relations of production--a transition which requires extensive financial
assistance.4 4 This economic transition may directly undermine the
traditional alliance between Eastern Europe and the developing coun-
tries. Not only are the countries of Eastern Europe adopting economic
policies that are directly antithetical to the economic changes contem-
plated by the NIEO, but these countries are also now in direct
competition with developing countries for both bilateral and multi-
lateral development assistance, debt alleviation, and capital investment
from the West. Indeed, international development assistance is already
being rerouted from the developing world to Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union. 45
IV. CONCLUSION
The post-Cold War international order opens windows of opportu-
nity for stronger enforcement mechanisms, more non-binding stan-
dards, and increased international and regional cooperation for the
promotion of international human rights. However, it is essential that
the discourse of international human rights is not itself compromised
in the efforts to achieve these ends. The real challenge facing inter-
national human rights in this era lies in resisting the homogenization
of human rights as civil and political rights. While regional organi-
zations, such as the CSCE, are well-positioned to assume a prominent
role in fostering new international cooperation, they cannot be ex-
pected to take the lead in promoting social and economic rights. The
reorientation of human rights promotion and economic development
along the East-West axis may only serve to deepen the divide between
North and South. A renewed commitment to the existing discourse
and fora for international human rights is required to ensure that the
political changes in Eastern Europe bring about a real increase in
44. For a general discussion of the financial requirements of the economic transition of Eastern
Europe, see Amy Deen & David A. Westbrook, Return to Europe: Integrating Eastern European
Economies into the European Market Through Alliance with the European Community, 31 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 660 (1990).
45. The chairman of a disaster committee of six international relief agencies, including the
League of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Oxfam and the World Council of Churches,
recently announced their groups' concerns that millions of people will face starvation in Africa
because of the emerging policy of the West of shifting aid to Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union. See Millions May Die In Africa, Agencies Say, The Globe and Mail, Jan. 5, 1991, at Al.
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democratic space within which rights claims can be made, rather than
simply a rise in conservative ideologies within which rights claims
will go largely unheard. But there may also be possibility in paradox.
Perhaps the depoliticized East-West dialogue offers a possibility of
political space for more substantive and less rhetorical debate on the
essential meaning of human dignity.
